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 Similarly, to most of their counterparts in Africa, South Africa and Kenya have a history 
of disrespecting constitutionalism by flouting their constitutions. This occurs despite the 
good intentions to preserve judicial independence, the rule of law, democracy and 
constitutionalism displayed by these countries by enshrining these values in their 
constitutions.   The guarantee of judicial independence by the constitution is essential for 
an impartial judge to preside without bias or favor over matters that involve the violation 
of the constitution by the executive, the legislature and even the judiciary itself. It is the 
enshrining of the independence of the judiciary that enables the Kenyan and South 
African courts respectively to deliver judgements that have declared unconstitutional and 
invalid the election of a sitting president during a presidential election in Kenya, declaring 
the conduct of the president and the legislature unconstitutional and invalid in South Africa 
and forcing these institutions to comply with the constitution. While both Kenya and South 
Africa can learn from each other with respect to the preservation of constitutionalism, it is 
more important that the democracies in the world should learn from these democracies 
which have taken giant steps in protecting judicial independence and, ultimately, 









The phrase “judicial entrenchment” may raise questions in academic literature relative to 
what is entrenched, against whom and by what means.1  The constitution uses language 
that creates positive obligations and places certain limitations that should be respected.  
The government and citizens are required to uphold the constitution, and, when they fail 
to do so, the judiciary becomes a vital device to monitor adherence to the spirit of the 
constitution.  The courts fortify respect for the constitution when they enforce compliance 
with the provisions of the constitution. In this regard the judiciary forces organs of state to 
make credible commitment that they will respect limitations and fulfill obligations imposed 
by the constitution. Entrenchment is not necessary when the commitment is fulfilled but it 
offers the best solution when there is any failure to fulfil the commitment.2   Judicial 
entrenchment of constitutionalism entails the reinforcement of constitutionalism through 
court judgements. This occurs when courts order compliance with the constitution and 
the executive, legislature and citizens respect and comply with the court orders.   
Constitutionalism is entrenched when compliance with the provisions of the constitution 
that is binding against subsequent executive   and legislative actions is enforced. 
 
Africa is primarily perceived by Western countries as being a dark continent which has 
little regard for human rights, the rule of law or constitutionalism.3  Given this background, 
most African countries sent a positive message that African countries would preserve 
constitutionalism by incorporating constitutional democracy as one of the core founding 
values in their post-colonial independence constitutions. Such positive intentions and 
aims are, however, negated by the conduct of African leaders who, despite the adoption 
                                                          
*paper delivered by Professor Mbuzeni Mathenjwa at the conference of the Network of African 
Constitutional Lawyers in Botswana on 11-13 October 2018. 
1    Posner EA & Vermeule A “ Legislative entrenchment: A reappraisal” ( 2002) 111Yale Law Journal   1665 
at 1666. 
2   Gilbert MD  “ The law  and economics of entrenchment” ( 2019) 54 Georgia Law Review 1 at 1. 
3   See  Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick 2013 (5) SA 325 (CC)  at para1. 
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of constitutions that promise democracy, the rule of law, constitutionalism, accountability 
and transparency, acquire absolute power and establish dictatorships.4  
Despite setbacks with regard to the preservation of constitutionalism by the legislature 
and the executive, the judiciary in some African countries has delivered judgments that 
have the potential of preserving constitutionalism. The recent judgments of the Supreme 
Court of Kenya, and the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa against the executive, Parliament and the Independent Electoral Commission 
revive hopes of the preservation of constitutionalism on the continent.  
This article discusses the development with regard to preserving constitutionalism 
through the judgments of the courts in the Kenyan and South African jurisdictions. The 
choice of these jurisdictions for comparison is informed by the similarities in providing for 
constitutional supremacy and judicial independence in the constitutions of both countries 
that enhances the role of the courts in deciding cases before them without fear or favour.5   
 The cases analysed are ground breaking cases in promoting constitutionalism in these 
countries. Kenyan electoral jurisprudence, where courts have decided on the validity of 
the presidential election of the sitting president to the position of the country’s   president, 
has received wide international attention, whereas South African courts decisions on   the 
legislature’s oversight on the president are topical issues in the continent. The recent 
Kenyan court decision that annulled the presidential election of Kenya and the recent 
judgements by the court which invalidated decisions of the president and Parliament in 
South Africa suggest a need for comparative research on the promotion of 
constitutionalism by the judiciary in these two democracies. In setting a pace for the 
                                                          
4   Olasunkanmi A “Constitutionalism and the challenge of development in Africa” (2014) 5   International 
Journal of Politics and Governance 1  at 2-3 points out that immediately after independence, the post- 
colonial African leaders are visibly and notoriously oppressive, and they have acquired absolute power 
which makes it possible for them to ensure that the people adjust to the structure of oppression and 
exploitation. 
5  Article 2 (1) of the constitution of Kenya of 2010 provides that the constitution of Kenya is the supreme 
law and binds all persons and all state organs at both levels of government; art 160 provides that in the 
exercise of judicial authority, the judiciary shall be subject only to the constitution and the law and shall 
not be subject to control or direction of any person or authority. Section  2 of the constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides that the constitution is the supreme law of the Republic, law or 
conduct inconsistent with it is invalid and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled; section 165 (2) 
provides that the courts are independent and subject only to the constitution and the law, which they 
must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice. 
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discussion, the notions of constitutionalism and judicial independence are explained. In 
discussing the notion of judicial independence, the constitutional framework for judicial 
independence in both countries is explored. Selected court decisions on presidential 
elections in Kenya, the legislature’s oversight of the president in South Africa is 
discussed.  The rationale for this discussion is to demonstrate how the judiciary has, 
through court rulings, enforced compliance with constitutional obligations and limitations 
placed on the executive and parliament in exercising their public powers. Finally, a 
conclusion is drawn about the effect of the South African and Kenyan jurisdictions in 
promoting constitutionalism  on the continent. 
 
2.  The notion of constitutionalism 
Literally, constitutionalism relates to governance in accordance with the constitution. The 
constitution is an essential element of constitutionalism. It is a charter of the state that 
sketches the nature and mode of government, including the classification, elections and 
terms of office of government officials, the division of government authority and the rights 
of citizens.6 The constitution is the fundamental law that deals with the creation, 
distribution, and exercise of state power.7 Constitutionalism could be explained from the 
positivist and neo-liberal theories. The positivists see the constitution as a source of 
positive obligation.8  It is an instrument of empowerment that creates positive benefits 
such as equal opportunity.9  Dobner points out that, in a constitutional democracy, the 
constitution should guarantee democratic government in that it does not only limit the 
government’s exercise of power but also legitimises such exercise of power.10  This notion 
                                                          
6      Greenberg D  Katz SM,  Oliviero MB &  Wheatley  S(eds) Constitutionalism and democracy: Transitions  
in the contemporary world  Oxford: Oxford University Press (1993)  at 8. 
 7      Okoth-Ogendo HWO “Constitutions without constitutionalism: A reflections on an African political 
paradox” in   Greenberg D,  Katz SN , Oliviero B &  Wheatly S  (eds) Constitutionalism and democracy: 
Transition in the contemporary world ( 1993)  67. 
  8   Gerstenberg O  “ Negetive/Positive constitutionalism, ‘ Fair balance,’ and the problem of justiciability”  
(2012) 10  International Journal of Constitutional Law 904   at 906. 
9      Barber A  “ Constitutionalism in exile: Is the constitution a charter of negative liberties or a charter of 
positive benefits?: Fallacies of negative constitutionalism   (2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 651  at 
660. 
10    Dobner P “ More law, less democracy?: Democracy and transitional constitutionalism” in   Dobner P &  
Loughlin  M(eds) The twilight of constitutionalism  Oxford: Oxford University Press ( 2010)  143. 
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of  constitutionalism, then, entails that a constitution should   be a source of positive 
obligation.  
The neo-liberal theorists see the limiting of government power as the chief object of 
constitutionalism. In reinforcing this view Okoth-Ogendo argues that there could be no 
constitutional government unless such mechanisms exist within the constitution itself for 
the supervision and limitation of government functions.11  This view is substantiated  by  
Rosenfeld  who points out that the essential elements of modern constitutionalism  are 
the limitation of governmental power, adherence to the rule of law and the protection of 
fundamental rights.12  
Despite different theories on constitutionalism, constitutionalism is grounded on the notion 
of keeping government focused on its respect for the constitution and the political will by 
political actors in government to fulfil constitutional obligations and abide by the limitations 
on the exercise of powers provided for in the constitution itself. First and foremost, political 
actors in government should exercise their powers within the confines of the constitution. 
The respect for the constitution is facilitated by the nature of a  democratic constitution 
that contains a set of norms upon which a nation’s diverse people have agreed  and which 
is applicable to all important matters of the people.13 Accordingly, constitutionalism does 
not entail governance in accordance with a constitution only but also that it is in 
accordance with the constitution that has the support of, and represents the aspirations 
of, the people.14   
 
3.  The notion of judicial independence 
                                                          
11   Okoth-Ogendo  (1993)  at 66. 
12    Rosenfeld M  “The rule of law and the legitimacy of constitutional democracy “ (  2001)  74 Southern 
California Law Review 1307 at 1307. 
13    Dobner  (2010) at 143. 
14   Ramcharan BG “ Constitutionalism in an age of globalisation and global threats” in   Frishman M  &  
Muller S (eds) The dynamics of constitutionalism in the age of globalisation  The Netherlands: Hague 
Academic Press (2008)  20. 
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The notion of judicial independence refers firstly to individual or personal independence 
that requires judges to interpret and enforce the law impartially and without bias.15 
Impartiality requires a judge to approach a specific case without taking into account his 
or her own personal views, ideological commitments or party political beliefs.16 It is, 
however, debatable whether judges can  ignore their personal views on political and 
social matters completely when interpreting provisions of the constitution. The 
Constitutional Court of South Africa has confirmed, in various judgments, that judges 
should not be influenced by any belief or outside interference when deciding cases before 
them.17 Secondly, the notion of judicial independence refers to institutional independence 
that pertains to structural safeguards that must be put in place to ensure that judges are 
protected from the influence of, and interference by, other branches of government.18 
Judges may not be impartial if the judiciary is not created  to be independent from other 
branches of government and the conditions under which the judiciary functions are not 
conducive  to the independent exercise of judicial authority.  The personality and skills of 
individual judges play a huge role on the independence of the judiciary. Judicial 
independence demands a high level of integrity and skills from judges. Judges must be 
grounded on integrity and possess  a high level of competence, because any appearance 
of impropriety would impact on public confidence  in the judiciary and negate the 
preservation of the independence of the judiciary.19 Basically  the principle of judicial 
independence  ought to protect judges from interference from governmental, business or 
                                                          
15  De Vos P & Freedman W (eds) South African Constitutional Law in Context  South Africa: Oxford 
University Press ( 2010) at  225. 
16   De Vos & Freedman  (2010) at  226. 
17   In President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union  1999 7 BCLR 725  
at para 48  the Constitutional Court warned that individual judges  should disabuse their minds of any  
predispositions  when presiding over  cases; in S  v Van Rooyen  ( General Council of the Bar of South 
Africa Intervening)  2002  8 BCLR  810at  para 19  the Constitutional Court affirmed that the essence of 
judicial independence is the complete liberty of individual judges to hear and decide cases before them 
without any interference by any outsider, pressure groups or even another judge. 
18   Siyo L & Mubangazi JC  “ The independence of South African judges: A constitutional and legislative 
perspective   ( 2015)  18 PER 817  at 818. 
19    Moliterno JE “The administrative judiciary’s independence myth” (2006) Journal of the national Association 
of Administrative Law Judiciary 53 at 56. 
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other social pressures includes:  the appointment of judges by an independent institution; 
security of tenure that ensures that judges will not be dismissed or face the threat of 
dismissal from office for making a decision adverse to the interests of the government; 
financial security that protects judges from a threat  of reducing their salaries and other 
benefits for making an unpopular decision; and the limitation of civil liability that 
guarantees that judges, in the carrying out of their functions,  will not incur civil liability for 
what they say or do.20  The mere proclamation of judicial independence, however, does 
not make judges impartial. Unwavering commitment to the oath of office and the 
disposition of a high level of competence by judges would reinforce the preservation of 
judicial independence. 
 
4.  Judicial independence in Kenya 
4.  1 The judiciary under the 1963 constitution 
In 1963, prior to its independence from Britain, Kenya negotiated and adopted its first 
independence constitution.21 The constitution did not make provision for the supremacy 
of the constitution nor the protection of the rule of law and the independence of the 
judiciary. The effect of the lack of the recognition of the independence of the judiciary in 
the constitution was manifest in the attitude of the executive  which restricted the 
discretion of the judiciary in various ways.  The relationship between the judiciary and the 
executive in Kenya  was characterised by attitudes of outright contempt and disobedience 
with regard to the processes and decisions of the courts by factions of the executive and 
the legislature.22 This view is reinforced by Ojwang J who states that, in the pre- 2010 
constitutional dispensation in Kenya, the government had  an attitude with regard to the 
judiciary that was clearly unfavourable to judicial independence.23 Oseko substantiates 
                                                          
20   Ojwang B  “The independence of the judiciary in Kenya”  (2008-2010) 2 Kenya Law Review  1 at  6 
explains that to protect the principle of judicial independence from compromises emanating from the 
executive progressive countries  democracies have adopted certain safeguards that include the mode 
of appointment of judges, providing for tenure for the judge, collective concurrence on a candidate for 
appointment as a judge, commitment to the governing ethos of judicial independence and absolute care 
in the regulation of terms of service and promotion for judges. 
21  See constitution of the Republic of Kenya of 1963. 
22   Mr Justice  Gicheru JE  “Independence of the judiciary: Accountability and contempt of court ( 2007)  1 
Kenya Law Review 1 at 1. 
23  Ojwang (2008-2010)  at 10. 
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this view when he argues that the legislative power was vested in the legislature, 
executive power in the president, but judicial power  was not similarly vested in the 
judiciary in the pre- 2010 constitutional dispensation.24   Oseko drew the conclusion that 
the omission of the specific powers of the judiciary contributed to the perception that the 
judiciary was an appendage of the executive.25  It is widely reported that, many years after 
independence, the executive in Kenya continued to interfere directly in cases before the 
courts.  In this regard, Oseko refers to instances where former President Moi was reported 
to have warned the judiciary to refrain from involvement in political party matters and to 
have further instructed the Chief Justice not to hear disputes against political parties.26 
For these reasons, Pfeiffer draws the conclusion that the 1963 independence constitution 
gave more control to the president over the appointment and removal of judges.27 
 Despite these negative perceptions about the independence of the judiciary, Kenyans 
trusted the courts on a number of occasions to adjudicate on presidential election 
disputes. In the judgment of Moi v Matiba,28 the applicant, one of the presidential 
candidates in the general elections held on 29 December 1992, filed a petition in court 
challenging the election of Mr Moi as the president-elect. In the proceedings before the 
electoral court the respondent - Mr Moi - raised a preliminary point that the matter should 
be struck off because the petition had not been signed by the petitioner. The electoral 
laws required that a petition filed in court against the election of the president must be 
signed by all the petitioners. 29  Although the petition had not been signed by the applicant, 
it had been signed by his wife who was exercising a power of attorney granted to her by 
the applicant. The applicant had used the same signature in accepting his nomination to 
                                                          
24   Oseko  OJ  “Judicial independence in Kenya: Constitutional challenges and opportunities for reform” ( 
unpublished D Phil thesis   Leicester University, United Kingdom 2011) at 132. Section 30 of the 
constitution of  Kenya  Amendment Act of  2008 vested the legislative power in parliament, section 23 
vested the executive power to the president and there was no express mentioning of the vesting of 
power to the judiciary.  Similarly to the independence constitution of 1963, the Constitution  Amendment 
Act  was silent  on the issue of  independence of the judiciary. 
25   Oseko  (2011)at 132. 
26  Oseko  (2011)  at 180. 
27   Pfeifer SB “ The Role of the judiciary in the constitutional systems of East Africa  (1978) 16  The Journal 
of Modern African Studies 33  at 47. 
28  See  Moi v Matiba and 2 others (2008 ) 1 KLR. 
29  Rule 4 (3) of  the National Assembly Elections, 1993 provides that  a petition  challenging the election of 
the president-elect shall be signed by all the petitioners. 
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contest presidential elections. The Electoral Court found that the signature by the wife of 
the applicant on a power of attorney which had been previously accepted by the Electoral 
Commission constituted a signature of the petitioner and was acceptable. On appeal by 
respondent to the Supreme Court, the Court found that rule 4 (3) of the National Assembly 
Elections did not allow the petition to be signed by anyone other than the petitioner 
himself/herself. Consequently, the petition was struck off. The challenge to the validity of 
the presidential election was dismissed on a technicality based on the interpretation of 
electoral laws. The irony of this decision is that, since the applicant was allowed to contest 
the election by   authorising his wife by a power of attorney to sign the nomination on his 
behalf, arguably the same form of signature could have been accepted for challenging 
the election results.   
In another presidential election dispute judgement of Orengo v Moi,30 the petitioner 
challenged the election of Mr Moi to the office of  president on a different ground than that 
in the  Moi v Matimba judgment.31  In 1992, before Mr Moi was elected as the president 
for the third term, the constitution  had been amended and limited the term of office that 
a person  could serve as president   to two terms with each term lasting for five years.32 
At the time the amendment  was introduced  Mr Moi had already served two terms. In 
dismissing the petition, the court held that the amendment did not operate retrospectively. 
Consequently, the two terms that Mr Moi had served prior to the coming into effect of the 
amendment were not affected by the amendment. This judgment could be criticised for 
not having considered the object of placing a limitation on presidential terms of office. 
Some of the rationale, among other things, for limiting the terms of public representatives 
in government is to avoid an inherent danger that a person could commit errors when 
kept in office for a long passage of time.33 By limiting the term of office the mistakes 
                                                          
30   See Orengo v Moi and 12 Others [2008] 1 KLR . 
31  See Moi v Matimba and 2 others (2008) 1 KLR. 
32  Section 9 (2) of  the constitution of Kenya Amendment  Act 6 of 1992 provided that no person shall  be 
elected to hold office of president for more than two terms. 
33   Epstein RA  “ Why we need term limits for congress: Four senate, ten in the house”  (2010) 78 Tennesse 
Law Review  849  at 856. 
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committed by the representative could be corrected, but it is harder to take corrective 
steps against a president  who enjoys an indefinite term of office.34  
The controversy surrounding presidential elections in Kenya cropped up again In Mwai 
kibaki v Daniel Moi.35  Once again the validity of the election of the president-elect - Mr 
Moi - after the general elections of the 29 December 1997 was challenged in court. The 
electoral laws required a petition challenging the validity of an election to be served on 
the respondent within 28 days from the date of publication of the result of the elections.36 
The applicant had published a notice of filing the petition challenging the results of the 
presidential election.  The respondent asked for an order to strike off the petition based 
on the ground that it had not been served on him. Subsequently, the Supreme Court 
struck off the petition based on the grounds that it had not been served on the respondent.  
It should be recognised that, although the president was not personally served with notice 
of the petition, such a notice  had been published in the Government Gazette.  Arguably, 
the respondent was the sitting president and, as the first citizen of the country, he ought 
to have known about the notice of the petition that had been published in the gazette.  
The court avoided hearing the petition on its merits and dismissed it on a technicality. 
 
4.  2 The judiciary under the 2010 constitution 
On 6 May 2010, Kenya adopted its new constitution.37 This constitution vests judicial 
authority in the courts and tribunals.38 The exercise of judicial authority is subject only to 
the constitution and the law and not to the control or direction of any person or authority.39 
Judges are protected from threats to reduce their salaries in that the remuneration and 
benefits payable to a judge shall not be varied to the disadvantage of that judge, and the 
retirement benefits of a retired judge shall not be varied to the disadvantage of the retired 
                                                          
34  Epstein (2010)  at 856. 
35  See Mwai Kibaki v Daniel Moi [1999] eKLR. 
36  Section (20) (1) of the National Assembly Election (Cap 7) provides  that a petition to question the validity 
of an election shall be presented and served within 28 days after the date of publication of the results of 
the election in the Government Gazette. 
37  See  constitution of Kenya, 2010. 
38   See article  159 (1) of the constitution of Kenya of 2010. 
39   See article 160 (1) of the constitution. 
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judge.40 The constitution establishes the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) that is 
mandated to promote and facilitate the independence of the judiciary.41 The JSC plays an 
important role in the appointment of judges to safeguard the independence of the 
judiciary. The president appoints the Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice on the 
recommendation of the JSC, subject to the approval of the National Assembly,42 and all 
other judges are appointed in accordance with the recommendations of the JSC.43  
Though the requirement of approval by the National Assembly gives the ruling party a 
disproportionate say on the appointment of the Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice, it 
is a vital check and balance  with regard to the  exercise of the president’s  powers.   
All judges shall retire from office upon attaining the age of 70 years, but they may elect to 
retire at any time after attaining the age of 65 years,44 and the Chief Justice cannot hold 
office for more than 10 years.45 A judge can be removed from office on the grounds of 
mental or physical infirmities, breach of the code of conduct prescribed for judges of 
superior courts by Act of Parliament, bankruptcy, incompetence or gross misconduct or 
misbehaviour.46 The removal of a judge may  be initiated only by the JSC.47 In removing 
a judge from office the president must act in accordance with recommendations of  the 
JSC.48  
The composition of, and the appointment of, members of the JSC are crucial for the 
preservation of judicial independence. The Commission  consists of the Chief Justice, 
who is the chairperson of the Commission, one Supreme Court judge elected by judges  
of the Supreme Court, one Court of Appeal judge elected by judges of the Appeal Court, 
one High Court judge, and one male and one female judge  elected by the society of 
judges and magistrates, the Attorney-General, one female and one male advocate 
elected by the professional body of advocates, one person nominated by the Public  
                                                          
40   See article  160 (4) of the constitution. 
41   See article 172 of the constitution. 
42   See article 166 (1) (a) of the constitution. 
43   See article 166 (1) (b) of the constitution. 
44   See article 167 of the constitution. 
45  See article 167 (2) of the constitution. 
46  See article 168 (1) (a)-(c) of the constitution. 
47  See article 168 (2) of the constitution. 
48  See article 168 (8) of the Constitution. 
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Service Commission, and one female and one male  person who are not lawyers and are 
appointed by the president with the approval  of the National Assembly to represent the 
public.49 
As pointed out above, the constitution that was adopted by Kenyans after independence 
did not make any provision for judicial independence.50  The 2010 constitution of Kenya, 
therefore, marked a remarkable breakaway from the previous constitutions by making 
provision for the protection of judicial independence.  The composition and appointment 
of members of the JSC leaves little room for the manipulation of the JSC by the executive. 
The executive, through the president, appoints only two of the ten members of the JSC. 
Furthermore, the appointment of the Chief Justice by the president on the 
recommendation of the JSC is likely to strengthen the independence of the court. Future 
chief justices would not need favours from the executive as they would be identified and 
recommended by the JSC. Oseko supports this view when he states that the 
requirements for the vetting of the aspirant Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice by 
members of the National Assembly bring  greatly needed checks on the executive power  
with regard to making appointments.51 This view, with regard to the appointment of 
judges, is reinforced by Mtunga who argues that the appointment process of judges is 
designed to give the judges independence from both the executive and the legislature so 
that judges can force other institutions of governance to do what they are supposed to 
do.52 
  
4.  3  Positive development on the independence of the judiciary under the 2010 
constitution of Kenya. 
                                                          
49  See article 171 (2) (a)-(g) of the constitution. 
50  Section  171 of the constitution of Kenya of 1963 established the Supreme Court of Kenya and section 
178 entrusted parliament with the power to establish other courts that were subordinate to the Supreme 
Court. The constitution was silent on the independence of the judiciary. 
51   Oseko (2011) at   232. 
52   Mtunga W  “The 2010 constitution of Kenya and its interpretation: Reflections from the Supreme Court’s 
decisions”  (2015)  1 Speculum Juris 1 at 9. 
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 The incorporation of the independence of the judiciary into the 2010 constitution reflects 
a positive step towards the protection of judicial independence in Kenya. Kenyans 
continued to show confidence in the judiciary by entrusting it with the task of resolving 
electoral disputes.  The case of Rail Odinga v The Independent Electoral and Boundaries 
Commission,53 marked the first judgement where the validity of the election of the 
president-elect was challenged after Kenya had held its first election, on 4 March 2013, 
after the promulgation of the new constitution.  After Mr Kenyatta had been declared the 
president-elect, petitioners, including Mr Odinga (one of the candidates who had 
contested the presidential elections) challenged the election of Mr Kenyatta to the position 
of president. The challenge was based on the grounds, amongst other things, that the 
electoral process was so fundamentally flawed that it precluded the possibility of 
discerning whether the presidential results were lawful or not.  The petitioners alleged 
that the candidate’s agents were excluded from the national tallying centre, there were 
variations in the numbers of registered voters, and there were many irregularities in the 
data capturing and information capturing.  With regard to the candidate’s agents, the court 
found that the agents had become rowdy and quarrelsome.  As a result, the decision of 
the Electoral Commission to remove them from the national tallying centre and relocate 
them to another room was justified.54 Although there were variations in the number of 
registered votes, the court found that there were not  major anomalies between the total 
number of registered voters and the total tally in the declaration of the presidential  
election results.55 It was further found that, although there were many irregularities in the 
data and information capturing during the registration process, these were not substantial 
enough to affect the credibility of the electoral process, and the petition was  consequently 
dismissed.56 
                                                          
53  See  Rail Amolo Odinga v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission and 3 Others [ 2013] 
eKLR. 
54   See Rail Amolo Odinga v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission and 3 Others at  para 
245. 
55   See Rail Amolo Odinga v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission and 3 Others at para 256. 




 It should be recognised that, in this judgment, the court found that there were 
irregularities in the election, but such irregularities did not negate the ‘freeness’ and the 
‘fairness’ of the election.  The difference between the electoral jurisprudence prior to 2010 
and since the passing of the 2010 constitution is that, prior to the 2010 constitutional 
dispensation, the courts did not decide the substance of the presidential disputes.  The 
petitions were merely dismissed on technicalities. In the post-2010 constitutional 
dispensation, the court for the first time considered and pronounced on the substance of 
presidential election.  
The outcome of the presidential elections of 2017 was further challenged in the Supreme 
Court in the recently decided case of Raila Amolo Odinga V Independent Electoral and 
Boundaries Commission.57  The issue arose from the presidential election held in Kenya 
on 8 August 2017. After the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) 
had announced that Mr Kenyatta, the sitting president of Kenya, had won the elections, 
his main challenger, Mr Odinga filed a petition challenging the declared results of the 
presidential election. The court held that the IEBC was obliged, under the constitution, to 
ensure that the voting system used  had been accurate, verifiable, secure, accountable 
and transparent, and that appropriate structures and mechanisms to eliminate electoral 
materials were put in place, including the safekeeping of election materials.58 The court 
found that, in the presidential election of 8 August 2017, the provisions of the constitution 
and  the Elections Act59  had been violated in that, at the time that the IEBC declared the 
final results, not all the results had been electronically and simultaneously transmitted 
from the polling stations to the national tallying centres and that the failure by the IEBC to 
verify the results before declaring them had violated  the constitution.60 Furthermore, there 
were numerous discrepancies between the results declared from various polling stations 
across the country.61 Consequently, the court issued an order declaring that the 
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presidential election held on 8 August 2017  had not been conducted in accordance with 
the constitution and the applicable law and that this rendered the declared result invalid, 
null and void. It also ordered that the IEBC should re-organise and conduct a fresh 
election in strict conformity with the constitution and the applicable election laws within 60 
days of the issuing of the judgement. 
This decision has been hailed as reflecting a strong and independent judiciary as the 
cornerstone of democracy in Kenya.62 The judgment was hailed as providing key lessons 
on how an independent judicial system functions, and there were calls on other 
democracies in the African continent to emulate Kenya in the matter of judicial 
independence. The judgement of the court demonstrates that the positive effort by 
Kenyans to safeguard judicial independence in their constitutions has come to fruition. 
The safeguard imposed on the appointment and composition of the JSC, the appointment 
of judges, and more particularly the Chief Justice who can be appointed only on 
recommendations by the JSC and approval by Parliament, provides that check and 
balance on the president’s power to appoint the judges.  
The re-run election was held in Kenya on 26 October 2017. Opposition parties boycotted 
the election, citing irregularities that would render the fresh election not free and fair.63 
Consequently, Mr Kenyatta contested and won the presidential election unopposed. 
Dissatisfied with the election of Mr Kenyatta, the petitioners launched a court application 
for an order setting aside such an election in the case of JH Mwau v Independent Electoral 
and Boundaries Commission and 2 Others.64   The petitioners  contended that the election 
had not been free from violence, intimidation, and corruption. They argued that, upon the 
nullification of the previous presidential election all documents, including the nomination 
of candidates and the issuance of nomination certificates used in the August election 
should not have  been saved and should not have been used in the re-run election.65 The 
                                                          
62   Walusansa W “ Emulate Kenya Judicial Independence”  (8-09-2017) Daily Monitor    https:// 
www.monitor.co.ug/OpEd/Letters?Emulate-Kenya-judicial-independence/8060313  (accessed  13 
September 2018). 
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16 
 
Supreme Court notwithstanding certain anomalies in the election process, the election 
met the threshold of credibility and legitimacy under the constitution.66 The petition was 
dismissed, and the election of Mr Kenyatta as the country’s president was upheld.67 
As pointed out above, unlike the situation in the pre-2010 dispensation where courts 
avoided to consider the merits and dismissed the   presidential elections disputes on 
technical grounds, in the post 2010 constitution era the courts considered and deliberated 
on the substance of the presidential disputes.  The attitude of the courts is likely to 
strengthen the confidence of the people in the judiciary.  The fearless attitude of the 
judges in deciding on presidential election disputes is bolstered by the enshrining of the 
independence of the judiciary in the constitution. For this reason, Mutunga praised the 
people of Kenya for choosing to place their faith in the institution of the judiciary in 
implementing the new constitution by providing for the institutional and decisional 
independence of the judiciary.68 
 Certainly, Kenya should be emulated as far as safeguarding judicial independence in the 
constitutions of countries is concerned, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Kenya 
on the presidential election contributes immensely to the promotion and preservation of 
constitutionalism in the world. Given the perception regarding the non-existence of the 
rule of law in Africa, the judgement that set aside the election of a sitting president 
reinforces constitutionalism and the rule of law. The reaction of the sitting president of 
Kenya in respecting the court judgment and agreeing to re-run the election shows that 
the independent judiciary could play a pivotal role in preserving constitutionalism. 
 
 5.  Judicial independence in South Africa 
Judicial independence is enshrined in the constitution of South Africa. The judicial 
authority in the Republic is vested in the courts.69 The courts are independent and subject 
only to the constitution and the law which they are required to apply impartially and without 
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fear, favour or prejudice.70 No person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning 
of the courts, and organs of state are required to assist and protect the courts through 
legislative and other measures to ensure their independence, impartiality, dignity, 
accessibility and effectiveness.71  This is a stronger position than that in Kenya in that in 
South Africa the constitution does not only guarantee judicial independence but also 
creates an obligation for organs of state to assist  and protect judicial independence  
through legislative and other measures. The support for judicial independence is, 
therefore, not merely a norm, but a constitutional obligation that must be fulfilled by organs 
of state. 
Judicial independence is strengthened by the prescription of the procedure for the 
appointment of judges and the establishment of an independent institution to facilitate the 
appointment and removal of judges from office. The constitution establishes the JSC 
which is the body responsible for the facilitation of the appointment of judges.72 The JSC 
comprises of the Chief Justice who presides at the meetings of the JSC, the President of 
the Supreme Court of Appeal, one Judge President designated by the judges’ president, 
the minister responsible for the administration of justice, two practicing advocates 
nominated  from within the advocates’ profession, two practicing attorneys nominated 
from within the attorneys’ profession, one teacher of law designated by teachers of the 
law at South African universities, six persons designated by the National Assembly, four 
permanent delegates to the National Council of Provinces(NCOP) designated by the 
Council with a supporting vote of at least six provinces,  and four persons designated by 
the president as the head of the national executive after consulting the leaders of all the 
parties in the National Assembly.73  The Judge President and the premier of a province 
where the High Court concerned  is located participate in the proceedings of the 
Commission when the Commission considers matters relating to any specific division of 
the High Court of South Africa.74 The  diverse composition of the JSC brings  balanced 
views  on the appointment of  judges. It subjects the judicial appointees to severe scrutiny 
                                                          
70   See section 165 (2) of the constitution. 
71  See section  165 (3)  of the constitution. 
72  See section 178 (1) of the constitution. 
73  See section 178 (1) (a)- (J) of the constitution. 
74  See section 178 (1) ( K) of the constitution. 
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and ought to prevent the shortlisting of unqualified and unsuitable candidates for judicial 
appointment. 
The president, as the head of the executive, is responsible for the appointment of judges. 
The president appoints the Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice after consulting 
the JSC and the leaders of the parties represented in the National Assembly, and he or 
she appoints the President and Deputy President of the Supreme Court of Appeal after 
consultation with the JSC.75 The president appoints other judges of the Constitutional 
Court from the list of candidates prepared by the JSC after consulting with the Chief 
Justice and the leaders of the parties represented in the National Assembly.76   The 
president appoints judges of all the other courts on the advice of the JSC.77 The nature of 
the appointment of the Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief Justice and the President of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal does not augur well  for the promotion of judicial independence. 
The untrammeled powers of the president with no prescribed qualification and guidelines 
for choosing candidates to the judicial positions may weaken the independence of the 
judiciary.  Aspiring candidates may compromise their independence in favour of the 
president, knowing that the president has carte blanche power to nominate candidates to 
these positions. 
Security of tenure for judges is also provided for in the constitution. The constitution 
prescribes the terms of office for the Constitutional Court judges and requires legislation 
to provide for the terms of office for judges of other courts.  Judges of the Constitutional 
Court hold office for a non-renewable term of twelve years, or until they attain the age of 
70, whichever occurs first, but the constitution gives Parliament the discretion to extend 
the term of office of a Constitutional Court judge.78 The Judges’ Remuneration and 
Conditions of Employment Act79  further regulates the security of tenure for judges. With 
regard to the security of tenure for judges of the Constitutional Court,  the Act restates the 
                                                          
75   See section  178 (3) of the constitution. 
76   See section  174 (4) of the constitution. 
77   See section 174 (6) of the constitution. 
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19 
 
provisions of the constitution.80  The  Constitutional Court judges who, on attaining the 
age of 70 years,  have not yet completed fifteen years of active service, must, however, 
continue to perform active service as  Constitutional Court judges  until the date by which 
they have completed a period of fifteen years of active service or have reached the age 
of 75 whichever occurs first.81  Judges of other courts shall be discharged from active 
service as judges when they reach the age of 70 years if they have completed a period 
of service of not less than ten years.82 Judges who, on reaching the age of 70 years, have 
not yet completed fifteen years of active service may continue to perform active service 
up to the date on which they complete a period of fifteen years or reach the age of 75 
years, whichever occurs first.83 Variation of retirement age of between 70 and 75    could 
be useful in retaining experienced judges to deal with backlogs of cases in the superior 
courts. Superior courts judges are overburdened owing to the shortage of judicial officers. 
As pointed out by the Chief Justice of South Africa in the 2018/ 2019 financial year given 
that the superior courts finalised only 75% of the reserve judgments,84   retaining of 
experienced judges years could lessen the shortage of judges and improve performance 
in the superior courts. 
Similarly, to the appointment of judges, the JSC plays a pivotal role in the removal of 
judges.  Judges may be removed from office only if the JSC finds that they are suffering 
from incapacity, are grossly incompetent or are guilty of gross misconduct and if the 
National Assembly calls for the judges to be removed by a resolution adopted with a 
supporting vote of at least two thirds of its members.85  Once the National Assembly has 
adopted the resolution calling for the removal of judges from office, the president  must 
remove the judges.86 
As stated above, the composition of the JSC is pivotal considering the powers bestowed 
on the JSC with regard to the appointment and removal of judges. The JSC ought to be 
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independent from the three branches of government.  It is, however, worrying that, of the 
fifteen permanent members of the JSC, eight are appointed by the president, although 
representatives from the professions of advocates and attorneys are nominated by these 
bodies respectively.87 In electing members to the JSC the legal professions do check on 
the power of the president because he or she can appoint only members that are elected 
by the professions themselves. The fact that the power to appoint finally rests with the 
president, however, places the president in a very strong position.  The president’s 
influence in the appointment of the JSC is further strengthened by the membership of the 
Minister of Justice who is a member of the president’s cabinet.  The minister is likely to 
carry a mandate from the president with regard to the activities of the JSC.   
The process and procedure for the appointment of the Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief 
Justice, the President and the Deputy President of the Supreme Court of Appeal may, 
thus, not adequately promote the independence of the judiciary. The JSC and Parliament 
play a minimal role in the appointment of these judges since they are merely consulted, 
but the president has the freedom to choose a person of his or her choosing provided he 
or she consults with these institutions before making an appointment. This grey area in 
the appointment of these judges may negate, instead of promoting, judicial 
independence. Judges who still aspire for promotion to these positions may compromise 
their personal independence to appease the executive.  Furthermore, the exercise of 
presidential power to nominate and appoint candidates of the president’s own choosing 
is likely to expose the candidates to widespread criticism by opposition parties and other 
civil society groups. Since it is the duty of the opposition parties to check and monitor the 
exercise of power by government, including that of the president, the opposition is likely 
to be skeptical about the impartiality of a candidate that is chosen by the president for 
appointment to these senior positions in the judiciary. In a practical sense, the 
announcement of the nomination of the current Chief Justice, Mogoeng Mogoeng CJ, by 
former President Zuma elicited severe criticism from opposition parties in Parliament and 
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civil society organisations who questioned his suitability for the position.88 Removing the 
power from the president to nominate, thus, and leaving him with  the power to appoint 
these judges on the recommendation of the JSC only , would not only protect the 
candidates from criticism but would also strengthen the independence of the judiciary. 
  
5.  1  Positive development on judicial preservation of constitutionalism 
It was pointed out above that judges should not only be independent from outside 
influence but also from interference by other judges. Judges as human beings also find 
themselves at odds with the law or become involved   as litigants in court before their 
colleagues. The rule of law and constitutionalism demand that an impartial judge be firm 
and apply the law without favour in those tempting situations where judges are called 
upon to decide against their own colleagues in the judiciary.  In Justice Alliance v 
President of the Republic of South Africa, Freedom Under Law v President of the Republic 
of South Africa, Centre for Applied Legal Studies v President of the Republic of South 
Africa,89 justices of the Constitutional Court had the opportunity to determine whether the 
extension by the executive of the term of office of their Chief Justice which had expired 
was congruent with the notion of judicial independence. Former President Zuma, relying 
on the then section 8 (a) of the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act 
which authorised the president to extend the term of office of a Chief Justice whose term 
of office had come to an end, 90 announced that he had decided to extend the period of 
office for Ngcobo CJ to remain in office for an additional period of five years. The validity 
of section 8 (a) of the Act and, subsequently, the extension of the term of office for the 
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Chief Justice was challenged before the court. The Constitutional Court held that the 
constitution vested  Parliament only with the power to extend the term of office of a 
Constitutional Court judge and that the provisions of section 8 (a) of the Judges’ 
Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act amounted to an impermissible 
delegation of Parliament’s legislative power to the president  which was inconsistent with 
the provisions of the constitution relating to judicial independence.91 Furthermore, it was  
held that section 8 (a) of the Act violated the principle of judicial independence by the 
granting of open-ended discretion to the president that  could raise a reasonable 
perception that the independence of the judiciary  might be undermined by the external 
interference of the executive.92 Consequently, section 8 (a) of the Judges’ Remuneration 
and Conditions of Employment Act was declared inconsistent with the constitution and 
invalid, and the consequent extension of the term of office of the Chief Justice was of no 
force and effect.93 
This judgment demonstrates a fearless and bold attitude by judges of the Constitutional 
Court when deciding a case not only against the executive and legislature but also against 
their own leader - the Chief Justice. In preventing the president from extending the term 
of office of the Chief Justice contrary to the spirit of the constitution, the justices of the 
Constitutional Court demonstrated that they were independent even from influence 
among themselves. 
Apart from pronouncing on judicial independence, the courts have given judgments on 
the violation of the constitution by the president and the failure of the legislature to oversee 
the exercise of power by the president. In the case of Economic Freedom Fighters v 
Speaker of the National Assembly; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National 
Assembly (Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 1),94  
members of the public, including a Member of Parliament, lodged complaints with the 
Public Protector concerning the security upgrades that were being effected at former 
                                                          
91   See Justice Alliance V President of the Republic of South Africa at   para 69. 
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President Zuma's Nkandla private residence. The Public Protector investigated the matter 
and concluded that several improvements were non-security features and that any 
installation that had nothing to do with the president's security amounted to undue benefit 
or unlawful enrichment to him and his family.95 In this regard, the Public Protector declared 
that the president had acted in breach of his constitutional obligations in terms of the 
constitution, and she took remedial action requiring the president to pay back a 
reasonable percentage of the cost of the non-security measures.96 The Public Protector 
submitted her report requiring action to the president and the National Assembly. The 
National Assembly set up an Ad Hoc committee to examine the Public Protector's report 
and further nominated the Minister of Police to do further investigations based on the 
findings of the Public Protector. After considering the Ad Hoc committee's report and the 
report of the Minister of Police, which exonerated the president, Parliament resolved to 
absolve the president of all liability. Consequently, the president did not comply with the 
remedial action required by the Public Protector. Dissatisfied with the decision of the 
National Assembly, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), joined by the Democratic 
Alliance (DA), two opposition parties in Parliament, launched a court application for an 
order directing the president to comply with the Public Protector's remedial action and 
declaring that both the president and the National Assembly had acted in breach of their 
constitutional obligations. The court found that, in disregarding the remedial action 
demanded of him by the Public Protector, the president had failed to uphold and defend 
the constitution as the supreme law of the land.97 It was found that the conduct of the 
National Assembly, in passing a resolution purportedly nullifying the findings and remedial 
action taken by the Public Protector and replacing them with their own findings, had 
offended the rule of law, and it  was another way of taking the law into their own hands.98  
This judgment has vital significance with regard to the preservation of constitutionalism in 
that, firstly, the opposition parties introduced a motion of  no confidence based on the 
Constitutional Court findings that the former president had violated the provisions of the 
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constitution against the president no less than three times.99 Though the motions were 
defeated, the court judgment stimulated debate in Parliament to preserve 
constitutionalism by holding the president to account and checking the incidence of 
corruption as a sign for the entire nation. Secondly, arising from the court’s judgement 
that ordered the president to pay back the tax payers’ money that was used for non-
security features, the president had to pay back to the nation the amount of R7.8million.100 
This judgment manifests the best judicial entrenchment of constitutionalism where the 
court pronounced on the limitation of the president’s exercise of powers, and this resulted 
in the repayment to the nation of the money illegally used for the benefit of the president.  
 In the Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly  (Economic 
Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 2),101 following t h e  failure by 
former President Zuma to comply fully with the Public Protector's remedial action in the   
Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 1 judgment, the EFF  
instituted an application in the Constitutional Court seeking a declaratory relief including 
an order directing the president to comply with the remedial action, and a declaration to the 
effect that the National Assembly too had breached a constitutional obligation in that it 
had  failed to hold the president accountable through section 89 (1) of the constitution  that 
is known as the impeachment process.102  The majority judgement of the court held that the 
process for removing the president from office must be preceded by a preliminary enquiry 
during which the National Assembly would determine that a listed ground existed.103  
Furthermore, the court found that section 89(1)  of the constitution implicitly imposes an 
obligation on the National Assembly to make rules especially tailored for an impeachment 
process and that the National Assembly had, in breach of section 89(1) of the 
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constitution, failed to make rules regulating the impeachment process.104  It was held that, 
by failing to determine whether the president had breached section 89 (1) of the 
constitution, the National Assembly had failed to hold the president to account 
following delivery of Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 1 
judgement where it was found that the president had violated the constitution by failing to 
comply with  the remedial action required by  the Public Protector.105 The court, thus, 
ordered the National Assembly to make rules regulating the impeachment procedure.106   
The significance of this judgment with regard to the preservation of constitutionalism is 
manifested both in the bold findings by the court that Parliament had failed to hold the 
president accountable and, in its order, requiring Parliament to adopt rules for the 
procedure regulating a motion for the removal of the president under an impeachment 
process. Arguably the Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 
1 and 2 judgments paved a way for the forced resignation of President Zuma from office.  
The pronouncement by the Constitutional Court that the president had failed to uphold 
the constitution bolstered the opposition parties in their numerous motions of vote of no 
confidence against the president because they referred to the court judgment that the 
president had failed to uphold the constitution of the Republic. As was reported in the 
media, President Zuma was forced to resign after his political party, the African National 
Congress (ANC), had publicly announced that it would support the motion of no 
confidence instituted by opposition parties against him in Parliament.107 
 
6.  Conclusion 
Guaranteeing judicial independence in a constitution is a necessary positive step towards 
promoting the independence of the judiciary which is essential for the preservation of 
constitutionalism. The protection of the notion of judicial independence should be 
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reinforced by the political will to abide by and respect courts’ decisions by the government 
of the day as well as the determination by the judiciary to be bound by the oath of office 
taken by judges and the exercise of judicial authority with integrity. The guaranteeing of 
judicial independence in the Kenyan and South African constitutions may not be a perfect 
safety net, but it does provide a safeguard to protect the judiciary from unwarranted 
threats and interference from the other branches of government. The recent judgments 
by the Kenyan and South African courts can be attributed to the protection of judicial 
independence in the constitutions of these countries. The fearlessness and unwavering 
stance taken by the courts in exercising their judicial authority is manifest in the trails 
where judgments have been given against the IEBC, executive and the legislature.  
Though the legislature and executive have flouted the constitution, they should, 
nevertheless, be hailed for generally respecting and abiding by the courts’ decisions. In 
this regard the conduct of the legislature and the executive strengthens the independence 
of the judiciary and, ultimately, promotes constitutionalism. Both the Kenyan and South 
African democracies can learn from each other, and other modern democracies in the 
world can learn further from the Kenyan and South African jurisdictions about the 
preservation of judicial independence and the promotion of constitutionalism. Given the 
weaknesses with regard to the appointment of the head of the judiciary and President of 
the Supreme Court of Appeal, South Africa can learn from Kenya and entrust the JSC 
with the authority to elect and recommend these judicial officers to the president for 
appointment. Reducing the dominance of the president in appointing judicial officers and 
the majority of members of the JSC would minimise the risk of the seeking of favours by 
the judges from the executive and hoping to receive favours through presidential 
appointment, and it would further strengthen the independence of the judiciary.  With 
regard to the review of actions of the president and Parliament, the Kenyan judiciary can 
also learn from the South African judiciary which has a history of fearlessly deciding 
against the government. If Africa respected court judgments and preserved 
constitutionalism, the perception about Africa’s being a dark continent that flagrantly flouts 
the rule of law, constitutionalism and principles of democracy would change. Though the 
stance taken by the Kenyan and South African courts on the preservation of 
constitutionalism cannot be fully celebrated owing to some of the challenges identified in 
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this article, it has shown a positive development that could provide a model for other 
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